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IRS’S CP-2000 E-MAIL SCAMS – NEVER IN DUBAI –
COMMON IN CANADA & THE UK
Richard T. Ainsworth
On September 22, 2016 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and its Security
Summit partners issued an alert to taxpayers and tax professionals to be on guard against
fake e-mails purporting to contain a tax bill related to the Affordable Care Act.1
Surprisingly, this e-mail scam works. It really should not.
Modern technology is facilitating many contemporary tax scams. In recent years
the US has seen false (refund) return scams, phone scammers impersonation IRS agents,
and now e-mail scams with fraudulent CP-2000 notices attached to a demand for
payment. The same phone and e-mail frauds have appeared in both Canada2 and the
UK.3 The timing of the Canadian and UK frauds suggest a migration of the phone fraud
1

IRS and Security Summit Partners Warn of Fake Tax Bills, IR-2016-123 (September 22, 2016) available
at: https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-and-security-summit-partners-warn-of-fake-tax-bill-emails
2
The pattern of frauds in Canada seem to replicate those in the US with phone scams migrating to e-mail
based scams. iCBC News, Canada Revenue Agency scam targeting wider Group of Canadians, (February
27, 2016) available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/windsor/canada-revenue-agency-scam-targetingwider-group-of-canadians-than-in-the-past-1.3466869 (indicating that “just about anybody in Canada” is
being targeted now); Adam Frisk, CRA Income Tax Phishing Scam still Going Strong, Police Warn, (July
6, 2016) available at: http://globalnews.ca/news/2806498/cra-income-tax-phishing-scam-still-going-strongpolice-warn/ (indicating that CRA impersonation phone scams accelerated significantly in Ontario during
2016, and that the scam had begun to migrate to e-mail communications where the scammer send official
looking CRA documents through e-mail seeking either personal identifiable information under the guise of
a refund, or seeking a tax payment); Jennifer Palma, CRA Scam Dupes Burnaby Woman out of $8K, (April
30, 2016) available at: http://globalnews.ca/news/2672145/cra-scam-dupes-burnaby-woman-out-of-8k/
(placing the money on iTunes cards because of threats of personal harm and the arrest of her husband);
Adam Miller, Ontario woman defrauded of more than $12K in iTunes gift cards in CRA scam (April 13,
2016) available at: http://globalnews.ca/news/2636187/ontario-woman-defrauded-of-more-than-12k-initunes-gift-cards-from-cra-scammers/ (threatened with 11 years imprisonment if she did not pay with
iTunes cards immediately); Melissa Gilligan, Calgary Woman Defrauded out of More that $12K in iTunes
CRA Scam, (April 21, 2016) available at: http://globalnews.ca/news/2653792/calgary-woman-defraudedout-of-almost-20k-in-itunes-cra-scam/ (threats of imminent arrest and liens placed on home, car and
investments persuaded this woman to pay $20K); Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ontario Fraud
Awareness Campaign: Fraudsters Threaten to Blow up a Victim’s House (January 18, 2016) available at:
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/on/news-nouvelles/2016/16-01-18-gta-rgt-eng.htm (providing a transcript of a
scammer’s call with a victim, and urging Canadians to be careful).
3
The pattern of frauds in the UK appears to following a reverse migration – starting in e-mail scams and
now moving to phone scams with the idea of using phone scams and iTunes cards apparently coming from
the US. Half million pound iTunes Gift Card Scams, GET SAFE ONLINE (August 11, 2016) available at:
https://www.getsafeonline.org/news/half-million-pound-itunes-gift-card-scams/ (indicating that the fraud in
the UK exceeds £520,000, and that one individual lost £46,000 to the scammers posing as HMRC
employees). Steven Chisolm, Fresh Warning Issues over iTunes Gift Card Scam, THE NEWS (August 8,
2016) available at: http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/crime/fresh-warning-issued-over-itunes-gift-cardscam-1-7516308 (indicating that the iTunes card variant of the HMRC impersonation fraud first appeared
in the UK in May 2016); iTunes Gift Card Scam Spreads to UK, PENTLANDS LTD. (ACCOUNTANTS)
available at: http://www.pentlands.ltd.uk/resource/itunes-gift-card-scam-spreads-uk (indicating that the UK
believes that the phone scams spread from the US into the UK); Callum Brodie, WARNING! Now its not
just Scam HMRC emails – expect calls too, MSENEWS (June 30, 2016) available at:
http://www.moneysavingexpert.com/news/phones/2016/06/warning-fake-hmrc-calls-on-the-rise---what-to-
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from the US to the UK and Canada. That is the analysis of the UK’s Action Fraud
Agency, part of the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) within the City of London
Police Department.4
From a US perspective, the timing of the UK and Canadian migration appears
right on target with the Action Fraud assessment. The arrest of a US phone scam
“ringleader,” Sahil Patel, on December 18, 2013 seems to have set the migration in
motion.
However, the conviction and sentencing of Sahil Patel to 14 years imprisonment
on July 8, 2015 apparently had a different effect in the US. Here we have seen the
mutation of this fraud into the present e-mail scam.5 By late October 2016 the US was
indicating in court documents that our phone scam was probably not a home-grown
fraud. The US fraud was not thought-up by Sahil Patel. He was a foot soldier, The US
phone scam was planned and “… organized by conspirators in India.”6 It is probably not
a coincidence that as the US closed in on this fraud, the very same fraud began to
accelerate in the UK and Canada.
The Indian government has begun an enforcement action against a number of call
centers outside Mumbai related to the IRS impersonation phone scam. Allegedly an “…
informer went to the [Indian] authorities a few weeks ago.”7 This report suggests that the
Indian enforcement action was independent of the US, UK or Canadian investigations.
The Indian arrests were for offenses committed in India, but where the losses were
do-if-youve-been-targeted (indicating the migration of e-mail based frauds to telephone scams searching
for PII or taxes alleged to be due); Simon Wells, Warning: Can you Really Trust that call from HMRC is
Genuine? QTAC PAYROLL (September 2016) available at: http://www.qtac.co.uk/qblog/2016/07/warningcan-you-really-trust-that-call-from-hmrc-is-genuine/ (indicating that some scams allege that the victim’s
PAYE has an overpayment to secure PII, or that additional taxes are due); HMRC, Avoid and Report
Internet Scams and Phishing, GOV.UK available at: https://www.gov.uk/report-suspicious-emailswebsites-phishing (explain how to respond to suspicious calls and e-mails); Scam Warning: Phone Message
Threatens HMRC Lawsuit, TAX HELP FOR OLDER PEOPLE, available at: http://www.taxvol.org.uk/scamwarning-phone-message-threatens-hmrc-lawsuit/ (indicating that elderly people are a target group for this
scam in the UK); Sean Keach, iTunes Gift Card Scam Revealed – one victim paid out £15,000, TRUSTED
REVIEWS, available at: http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/apple-itunes-gift-card-scam-revealed
4
ActionFraud, iTunes Gift Cards Favored by Fraudsters (August 5, 2016) available at:
http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/news/itunes-gift-cards-favoured-by-fraudsters-aug16.
5
US Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, Ringleader Of Extortion Ring Sentenced To More
Than 14 Years In Manhattan Federal Prison For Massive “Call Center” Fraud Scheme (July 8, 2015)
available at: https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/ringleader-extortion-ring-sentenced-more-14-yearsmanhattan-federal-prison-massive-call
6
US Attorney, Southern District of Texas, Dozens of Individuals Indicted in Multimillion-Dollar Indian
Call Center Scam Targeting U.S. Victims, (October 27, 2016) available at: https://www.justice.gov/usaosdtx/pr/dozens-individuals-indicted-multimillion-dollar-indian-call-center-scam-targeting-us. US v.
HGlobal is the result of a multi-agency, three-year investigation into the phone scams that brought 61
individuals and entities to court on criminal conspiracy, wire fraud and money laundering charges. This
case is going to trial in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division and involves 20 individuals
arrested in the US, 32 others in India along with 5 Indian call centers.
7
Hari Kumar, Call Centers in India Posed as I.R.S. to Cheat U.S. Taxpayers, Authorities Say, NYT
(October 5, 2016) available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/world/asia/india-call-centers-phonescam-irs.html.
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realized overseas. Extraditions are likely.8 “[Indian] authorities arrested 70 people
Wednesday [October 5] alleging that they helped manage nine call centers where about
700 people made thousands of calls a day to try to trick Americans into sending money.”9
If past patterns prevail one might expect that closing the five call centers
identified in the HGlobal indictment10 would only mean that other call centers would take
up the business, and the fraud would continue. The same frauds, from the same Indian
call centers also appear to be behind a phone fraud up-tick in Australia,11 and New
Zealand.12 Following the same pattern, Irish phone frauds recently morphed into e-mail
scams purportedly coming from Irish Revenue, which the Irish believe migrated into
Ireland from the UK.13
This is like a game of “whack-a-mole.” When a tax scam gets put down in one
area we tend to see both:
(a) a migration of the fraud to other jurisdictions (the US phone scam’s migration
to Canada and the UK), and
(b) a domestic mutation of the fraud (the US phone scam morph into the CP-2000
e-mail scam.)
New scams pop up whenever old scams are put down.
There are lessons to be learned. Not only is international cooperation essential
when frauds are foreign inspired, fast moving and technology based, but heightened
attention needs to be paid to structural weaknesses in the domestic tax codes, processes,
and procedures, because mutating tax scams seek out and take advantage of weaknesses
wherever they exist.

8

32 of the 61 defendants in the HGlobal case are listed as Indian nationals.
Shefali Anand, Indian Police Bust IRS ‘Scam Center,” WSJ (October 5, 2016) available at:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/indian-police-detain-workers-over-possible-irs-phone-scam-1475674691
10
The call centers identified were: HGlobal; Call Mantra (d.b.a. Robust Inc., Raytheon International;
Worldwide Solution; Zoriion Communications PVT. LTD.; and Sharma BPO Services.
11
Brett M. Christensen, Australian Phone Scammers Threaten Arrest for Tax Evasion, HOAXSLAYER
(March 10, 2016) available at: http://www.hoax-slayer.net/australian-phone-scammers-threaten-arrest-fortax-evasion/
12
There Back – The Phone Scammers Pretending to be from the IRD, (June 21, 2016) available at:
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/money/81285475/phone-scammers-pretend-to-be-from-ird-to-threatenpublic; Inland Revenue (New Zealand), Don’t Fall for Phone Scammers Alleging Tax Evasion, says Inland
Revenue (June 16, 2016) available at: http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/media-centre/mediareleases/2016/media-release-2016-06-16.html
13
Irish Tax and Customs, Warning: Latest Email and SMS (text message) Scam, Revenue (November 8,
2016) available at: http://www.revenue.ie/en/spotlights/email-scam.html; European Consumer Centre
Ireland, ECC Ireland Warns Consumers of Tax Refund Scam (2016) available at:
http://www.eccireland.ie/ecc-ireland-warns-consumers-of-tax-refund-scam/ Urban Schrott, ESET Ireland,
Irish Revenue Email and Text Scams Abundant, (November 2, 2016) available at:
https://blog.eset.ie/2016/11/02/irish-revenue-email-and-text-scams-abundant/
9
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In their hay-day, the false return scams in the US generated at least $500 million
in “profit.”14 Until recently, the US phone and e-mail scams never appeared capable of
reaching these levels of “profitability.” As recently as October 1, 2016, the Wall Street
Journal was reporting that collectively the phone and e-mail scams stole roughly $47
million from more than 8,800 individuals.15 However, the unsealed Houston indictment
indicates that the numbers are much higher. For just the phone scam alone $300 million
was scammed from over 15,000 individuals between 2012 and 2015.16
This paper focuses on the new e-mail scams, a mutation of frightening potential.
It is a technology-based scam, and it has the capability to eclipse all the older scams. It
needs to be taken very seriously. The problem in both the phone and e-mail scams is
very simple – how can a taxpayer quickly and easily confirm the accuracy of an assertion
of tax liability posed in an e-mail, letter or phone call when the matter is presented with
an urgency that does not leave a lot of time for consultation and consideration?
A solution is available. Government technology in the UAE would prevent it.
Dubai would help its citizens identify and bock this scam with confidence, in much the
same manner as the IRS plans to use “verification codes” to block false W-2s.17 This
paper proposes a Dubai type of solution to the current e-mail scam. The US, UK,
Canada, Australia, NZ, and Ireland should do for its citizens what Dubai does for theirs –
adopt a technology solution. The cost is an infinitesimal fraction of the losses.
HOW DID THE E-MAIL SCAM ARISE?
In the current email scam taxpayers receive an e-mail attachment (allegedly a bill
from the IRS) that is a reasonably good reproduction of IRS Notice CP-2000.18 A true
14

J. Russell George, Identity Theft and Tax Fraud, testimony at 7-8, Hearing Before the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency and Financial
Management, US House of Representatives (November 4, 2011).
For Processing Year 2011 (through September 10, 2011), the IRS reported that it had
identified over 1.6 million tax returns with more than $12 million claimed in fraudulent
tax refunds … [and] of the 1.6 million tax returns identified as fraudulent for Processing
Year 2011, a total of 851,602 of these tax returns, with $5.8 billion in associated
fraudulent refunds, involved identity theft. … [But,] overall, the IRS does not know how
many identity thieves are filing fraudulent returns and how much revenue is being lost.
The testimony indicates (at 7) that the IRS claims to have prevented 94% of refund frauds or $11.5 billion,
which leaves $500 million unaccounted f
15
Laura Saunders, The New IRS E-mail Scam, WSJ (October 1, 2016) at B7.
16
Gabrielle Banks, Call center scams cheated 15,000 out of $300 million, indictment charges, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (October 27, 2016) available at: http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Call-center-scams-cheated-15-000-out-of-300-10418467.php
17
This effort was part of the IRS’s real time initiative. IRS News Release, IRS to Host Second Real-Time
Tax System Meeting, IR-2012-10 (January 18, 2012), Tax Analysts Doc 2012-963; IRS Tests W-2
Verification Code for Filing Season 2016, available at: https://www.irs.gov/individuals/w-2-verificationcode. Richard T. Ainsworth, Refund Fraud? Real-Time Solution, TAX NOTES (February 27, 2012) at 1165.
Richard T. Ainsworth, Real-Time Solutions to Refund Fraud: VAT Lessons from Belgium, Brazil, and
Quebec, 66 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 533 (May 7, 2012)
18
Claudine Gindel, IRS Fraud Update as Scammers Get Smarter, IRS MEDIC (law offices of Parent &
Parent LLP) October 3, 2016 available at: https://www.irsmedic.com/2016/10/03/irs-fraud-fake-cp2000/.
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CP-2000 is a computer generated notice from an IRS data-matching program (the
Automated Underreporting Program) which identifies variances between return
information provided by the taxpayer and information reported to the IRS by third party
employers, banks and businesses on Forms W-2, 1090 and 1099.
A true CP-2000 is not a bill. It is a notice from the IRS that there is an apparent
mismatch in IRS data. It is not a demand for payment nor is it an audit determination.
The CP-2000 simply asks a taxpayer if they can explain a variance. But, that’s not how
the fraudsters are using it. In the hands of the scammers a fake CP-2000 becomes a
demand note for immediate payment.
The e-mail scam is developing in response to the three-year IRS phone scam
enforcement action that culminated in the HGlobal grand jury indictment unsealed at the
end of October 2016 in the Houston District Court. Two of the four “domestic
managers” of the phone scam, who reported to Sahil Patel, live in the Houston area.19 Is
it just a coincidence that 160 miles to the west of the Houston courthouse is the Austin
post office box where the national CP-2000 e-mail scam demands that taxpayers remit
their payments?
In the March 2015 Report to Congress the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (TIGTA) summarized the phone scam. He stated that fraudsters making
calls would deal with skepticism on the part of taxpayers with declarations of authority.
For example callers would “… use a fake name, tell[ing] the victim a made-up badge
number, and claim[ing] that the victim owe[d] taxes and [was] criminally liable for the
amount owed…. [callers presented evidence of authority by reciting] the last four digits
of the victim’s SSN …”20
The phone scam brought in hundreds of millions of dollars, but it suffered from a
lack of plausible evidence that the caller was indeed an IRS agent. At some point an
enterprising fraudster hit upon the idea of producing fake CP-2000s to buttress assertions
of liability. In March 2016 TIGTA reported that, “… individuals claim[ing] to be IRS
employees on the telephone [were] misus[ing] IRS logos, seals, or symbols to create
official-looking letters and e-mails.”21

(posting a copy of a fake CP-2000 notice marked up by the authors to show where the variances are with a
true CP-2000, and observing:
I was surprised when we got our hands on one of the fake letters; it looks pretty legit. I
also thought it was smart of the scammers to only ask for $325.00 … a reasonable
amount. And if someone took the time to call the IRS to see if they owed this money,
there’s a good possibility they would be put on hold for 2 hours before getting a
“courtesy disconnect” due to the long hold times.)
19
The four domestic managers are Sunny Joshi and Rajesh Bhatt (a.k.a. Manoji Joshi) located in Sugar
Land, Texas (a suburb of Houston) and Mteshkumar Patel and Rajubhai Patel located in Willowbrook,
Illinois (a suburb of Chicago).
20
TIGTA Semiannual Report to Congress (March, 2015) at 54.
21
TIGTA Semiannual Report to Congress (March, 2016) at 40.
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When TIGTA further reported that it had, “… shut down 431 of the 574 telephone
numbers used by the scammers,”22 it’s easy to see what happened next. The fraud
mutated. It went into the Internet, and deeper into technology. CP-2000s were mailmerged with a victim’s identity information and then delivered by e-mail. A new scam
was born on the ashes of the old.
It is noteworthy how swiftly and broadly the new e-mail scam took hold. This
tells us something important. Agility like this is common when organized crime becomes
engaged in tax fraud. The same kinds of mutation and migration patterns can be seen in a
number of European Union (EU) frauds. In particular, fraudsters in the EU have been
engaged in massive, highly organized missing trader (MT) frauds in the value added tax
(VAT). Many of these frauds (like the phone scams and e-mail scams in the US) are
remotely controlled from outside the country where they do damage. Some are
controlled from as far away as Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
EU MT frauds started with networks of fake businesses selling mobile phones.
When enforcement arose in the mobile phone market the fraud quickly mutated. New
fake networks began selling computer chips in grand circles (carousels) to steal VAT
refunds. When the computer chip fraudsters were pursued the fraud mutated (again) and
moved deeper into technology. Most recently MT frauds involve the sale of hard to trace
(but easy to transfer) intangible commodities like VoIP calling rights, and CO2 emission
permits. EU losses are in the hundreds of billions of euro annually. MT fraud has
become so severe that it threatens to bring down (completely restructure) the EU VAT.23
Because the EU has not adopted the technology solutions at hand, for example
blockchain (distributed ledger) technology,24 or a Bitcoin (VATCoin) solution,25 the EU
enforcement efforts are hamstrung. Gumshoe, traditional audits predominate. The frauds
continue to mutate. Huge legal and audit resources are pumped into global searches for
elusive masterminds who direct the fraud’s foot soldiers from abroad.
Both the Italian26 and Russian27 mafia are known to be engaged in MT frauds
along with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda,28 and the Islamic State (ISIS).29 Is something

22

TIGTA worked with the phone companies to try to resolve the phone scams.
To protect taxpayers from being victimized by the scammers TIGTA established an
“Advise and Disrupt” approach to the scam that identifies the telephone numbers used by
the scammers and, through an automated process, calls those telephone numbers to advise
those scammers that their activity is fraudulent and criminal.
TIGTA Semiannual Report to Congress (March, 2016) at 3 and 41.
23
EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee, on an action plan on VAT, Towards a Single EU VAT Area –
Time to Decide, COM(2016) 148 final (April 7, 2016).
24
Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew Shact, Blockchain Technology Might Solve VAT Fraud, 83 TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL 1165 (September 26, 2016).
25
Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi & Mike Cheetham, VATCoin: The GCC’s Cryptotaxcurrency,
83 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming).
26
Richard T. Ainsworth, The Italian Job – Voice Over Internet Protocol MTIC Fraud in Italy, 58 Tax
Notes International 721, 733 (May 31, 2010) (discussing the involvement of the Ndrangheta mafia (a crime
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comparable happening in the US? Who is really behind these highly organized US
scams? Is it an enterprising individual in India or a known organized crime group? We
are clearly witnessing a series of orchestrated attacks on the US tax system. Can we stop
it?
Are the masterminds located where the phone lines end (in India), as suggested in
the HGlobal indictment? The American tax system has been scammed before to fund
terrorist groups. Hezbollah used sales suppression frauds and cigarette smuggling in the
US to fund its activities.30 Is it happening again?
THE FRAUDS RELY ON SPEED
Technology-based frauds place a premium on speed. Transactions happen fast,
money changes hands fast, and everything is designed to collapse and evaporate on a
moment’s notice. Traditional audit techniques are no match for technology. The trail to
the mastermind is gone almost as soon as it is walked upon. The real organizers are
hidden behind row upon row of expendable operatives who are paid a small percent of
the funds passing through their hands.
The scammers made thousands of calls and used technology to hide where
the calls were coming from and where the victims’ payments were being
sent.31
syndicate from the toe of the Italian boot) in a tax fraud constructed around VoIP and a money laundering
operation, the funds for which came from an earlier MTIC fraud in cell phones).
27
Ashley Seager & Ian Cobain, Carousel Fraud: Bogus Deals keep Customs in a Spin: Smart Criminals
Stay Ahead of Investigators Russian Mafia and IRA Linked to Swindles, THE GUARDIAN (May 9, 2006)
(discussing through interviews how the Russian mafia push into a cell phone MTIC fraud operation run by
two Englishmen and took over).
28
Staff report, Italy Tax Scam “may have funded terrorism,” THE LOCAL (September 24, 2014) available
at: http://www.thelocal.it/20140924/1bn-italy-tax-scam-may-have-funded-terrorism (describing Italian
reports by the Milan prosecutor that a €1.15 billion tax scam involving the trade of carbon credits through
Italy may have financed terrorism based on documents found at the Afghanistan/Pakistan border by US and
UK special forces pursuing Osama bin Laden before he was killed in 2011); Luigi Giuseppe Guastella
Ferrarella, The Great Scam of VAT in Italy to Finance Islamic Groups, CORRIERE DELLA SERE (September
24, 2014) available at: http://www.corriere.it/cronache/14_settembre_24/grande-truffa-dell-iva-italiafinanziare-gruppi-islamici-ec394336-43a5-11e4-bbc2-282fa2f68a02.shtml?refresh_ce-cp (in Italian)
29
Bo Elkjaer, Troels Kingo Larsen & Mads Nilson, Terror Suspects involved in Food Fraud in
Copenhagen, DR (January 25, 2016) available at: http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/penge/terrormistaenkteindblandet-i-foedevarefusk-i-koebenhavn (describing terrorist suspects acting as directors of Danish firms
participating in VAT frauds in soft drinks, chocolate and frozen chickens who funneled the funds to the
Islamic State and Al Qaida while supporting Spanish recruitment of fighters under investigation by Spanish
authorities) (in Danish).
30
Jay Solomon, US Targets Hezbollah Funds: Counter-terror Efforts Are Heightened Against Iran-Linked
Group WSJ (April 24, 2006) available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114583738810833688
(referencing the LaShish restaurant case involving skimming retail sales tax receipts, and the cigarette
smuggling frauds whereby un-taxed cigarettes are brought into Michigan and sold without collecting
Michigan taxes); Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Eastern District of Michigan, Superseding Indictment
returned Against LaShish Owner (May 30, 2007) available at:
http://www.justice.gov/tax/usaopress/2007/txdv072007_5_30_chahine.pdf
31
Shefali Anand, Indian Police Bust IRS ‘Scam Center,” WSJ (October 5, 2016) available at:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/indian-police-detain-workers-over-possible-irs-phone-scam-1475674691
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An investigation of the phone scam conducted by the Pindrop Security Blog,
published on April 14, 2014 is eye-opening. In less than 30 days Pindrop tracked the
fraud that became the Houston indictment two years later. TIGTA’s March 2014 semiannual Report to Congress was the first official (public) report of the phone scam in the
US. Pindrop decided to test TIGTA’s statements the next month. It indicated:
The IRS is warning people about the “largest ever” phone fraud scam
targeting taxpayers. In the interest of learning more about this phonebased threat, Pindrop has investigated the attacks …
Findings:
• Attackers are using MagicJack VoIP phone numbers for consumers
to “call back” as part of this attack. …
• The attackers appear to be operating out of India and are seeking
approximately $5,000 per successful attack.
• The attackers are asking consumers to use GreenDot Money-Pak
service to wire money to a PayPal account.
• As compared with previous attacks involving impersonation of the
IRS, this attack involves much higher volumes, with complaints in
excess of 10 times higher than previously seen. We estimate the
number of attack calls has already exceeded 450,000 in March
[2014].32
Given that the US “ringleader” (Sahil Patel) was arrested on December 18, 2013,
the following two charts by Pindrop are interesting. In the first chart Pindrop graphs the
MagicJack VoIP phone numbers used by the fraudsters up through April 2014.33 Rather
than decreasing immediately after the arrest of Sahil Patel, the Pindrop records show that
the phone calls increased almost “off the charts.”
This suggests that rather than running and hiding after the alleged US “ringleader”
was arrested and the fraud was substantially uncovered, the true masterminds “doubled
down” on the US phone scam, and tried to squeeze every last dollar out of the American
public before moving on.

32

PINDROP SECURITY BLOG: PHONE SECURITY ISSUES. Peter Casanova, Raj Bandyopadhyay & Vijay
Balasubramaniyan, Largest IRS Phone Scam Likely Exceeded 450,000 Potential Victims in March (2014)
available at: https://www.pindrop.com/irs-phone-scam-live-call_analysis/#prettyphoto/0/
33
MagicJack is an inexpensive, online VoIP service. Pindrop accurately determined that the fraudsters
were using this service in 2014. This is the same conclusion reached by the Grand Jury in the HGlobal
indictment, which indicated that 1,500 MagicJack numbers were used. MagicJack numbers organize large
portions of the indictment. For example (713) 370-3224 MagicJack was registered in the name of an
individual in Waco, Texas (stolen identity) by individuals in Ahmedbad, Gujarat, India. It was used to
access more than 4,000 General Purpose Reloading (GPR) cards to transfer funds from other cards
registered in the names of over 1,200 different misappropriated identities in the year 2013.
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The second chart of interest is the time distribution of the calls. It is clear that this
scam is working on Central and Eastern Time. This suggests that the Indian call centers
are being closely coordinated with US operatives. The four US domestic managers are
located in the same time zones (two are living outside of Chicago, Illinois, and two are
living outside of Houston, Texas). Are the masterminds in the US or outside the country?
The Grand Jury states that the phone scam was planned and “… organized by
conspirators in India.”34 This makes everyone in the US a foot soldier. Real control is
elsewhere.
The Pindrop charts make sense. Foot soldiers do not “double down” (of their own
volition) when they are engaged in a visible fraud, and they certainly do not do that at the
moment when the police are knocking at the door arresting supervisors. Foot soldiers
“double down” like this when they are ignorant of what is going on, and when they are
tightly controlled from above. Pindrop found and published in one month (April 15,
2014 – tax day) what the Grand Jury only announced in October of 2016.

34

US Attorney, Southern District of Texas, Dozens of Individuals Indicted in Multimillion-Dollar Indian
Call Center Scam Targeting U.S. Victims, (October 27, 2016) available at: https://www.justice.gov/usaosdtx/pr/dozens-individuals-indicted-multimillion-dollar-indian-call-center-scam-targeting-us. US v.
HGlobal is the result of a multi-agency, three-year investigation into the phone scams that brought 61
individuals and entities to court on criminal conspiracy, wire fraud and money laundering charges. This
case is going to trial in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division and involves 20 individuals
arrested in the US, 32 others in India along with 5 Indian call centers.
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In the March 2016 Semiannual Report to Congress TIGTA reported that it had
shut down 431 of the 574 telephone numbers used by the phone scammers. By the time
of this announcement the phone scam had already migrated to Canada and the UK. The
US was in the midst of different scam, the CP-2000 e-mail scam.
The scam morphed from phone calls to e-mails, but the essential problem for the
American citizen remained the same. The Taxpayer’s problem is that under either of
these scams the fraudsters are placing him under pressure to respond to an apparent
message from the IRS which is threatening immanent arrest, seizure of assets, or worse.
How can the validity of this message be verified? How can it be done simply, quickly,
and authoritatively?
In the case of the CP-2000 e-mail scams the IRS advice is to scrutinize the CP2000 notice that was received, and try to identify it as fraudulent. The IRS says the first
thing the Taxpayer should do is compare the CP-2000 they received with a real CP-2000
printed in the IRS document Understanding Your CP2000 Notice. This document is
posted on the web.
In addition, the taxpayer should look for the following signs of fraud in the
document it has received:
(a) the false CP-2000 notice will appear to be issued from an Austin, Texas
address;
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(b) the unreported issue will be related to the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
requesting information regarding 2014 coverage;
(c) the payment voucher will list the letter number as 105C
(d) the taxpayer will be requested to make a payment with a check made out to
“I.R.S.” at the “Austin Processing Center” and at a post office box (a true CP2000 asks that a check be made out to the “United States Treasury”);
(e) an additional “payment” link will be embedded in the e-mail itself.35
This advice is not simple, nor can a stressed taxpayer do it quickly. It is however,
very similar to the advice offered by the HMRC in the UK,36 or the CRA in Canada when
their taxpayers receive similar fraudulent notices from scammers.37 There is a better
way.
THE DUBAI SOLUTION
Dubai does not have a modern tax system. It relies on a 55% tax on oil and gas
company profits, and a 20% tax on the income of foreign banks. A 5% VAT is planned
for January 1, 2018.
Residents do make regular payments to the government for utilities. Invoices for
usage are mailed to residents on paper, and e-mail. The distinctive part of each
communication is the QR code placed on each communication. Residents scan the QR
code to verify the invoice with a government provided app. The verification procedure is
the same process used by WhatsApp for Web.38 The Dubai app also facilitates direct
payment, if the resident links the app to a bank account.
THE APPLICATION
Adapting the Dubai Solution to the US phone scams and e-mail scams would be
relatively easy. There are six steps (and an optional seventh step):
STEP ONE: The IRS would use an official government web site through which any
citizen could download the security app. The app is downloaded within the user account
of the IRS web site, and not from an app store.

35

IRS and Security Summit Partners Warn of Fake Tax Bills, IR-2016-123 (September 22, 2016) available
at: https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-and-security-summit-partners-warn-of-fake-tax-bill-emails.
36
Action Fraud, Alert: HMRC and iTunes gift card scam, (May 18, 2016) available at:
Thttp://www.actionfraud.police.uk/news/alert-hmrc-and-itunes-gift-card-scam-may16; UK Gov, Avoid and
Report Internet Scams and Phishing, (August 30, 2016) available at: https://www.gov.uk/report-suspiciousemails-websites-phishing.
37
RCMP, Ontario Fraud Awareness Campaign: Fraudsters Threaten to Blow Up a Victim’s House,
(January 18, 2016) available at: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/on/news-nouvelles/2016/16-01-18-gta-rgteng.htm
38
WhatsApp, WhatsApp Encryption Overview: Technical white paper (April 4, 2016) available at:
https://www.google.com/#q=WhatsApp+Encryption+Overview+Technical+white+paper
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STEP TWO: The user would be presented with a SSL (Secure Socket Layer) certificate
from a verified certificate authority.39 The certificate would show that the web site is the
correct IRS web site and not a web site set up by criminals to look like the IRS site.
Whenever a citizen would go to this web site through the app the web site would display
a known symbol or picture to the user.
STEP THREE: Every IRS document (whether issued on paper, as an e-mail, or through
an attachment to an e-mail) would contain a QR (Quick Response Code) code.40
STEP FOUR: There are two QR codes used in each verification transaction. One is on
the paper document, e-mail, or e-mail attachment in the hands of the citizen; the other is
on the IRS web site.
STEP FIVE: The function of the app on the smart phone is to test the two QR codes as a
key pair.
STEP SIX: Within less than a second, the app will return to the citizen document
verification.
STEP SEVEN: If the government is interested in policing this fraud area more
thoroughly it could (in instances where the app rejected the pairing of the QR codes)
allow the citizen to submit a digital notification to the IRS that an individual
impersonating an IRS officer had attempted fraud. There could be a “whistle blower”
award attached to this notification.
IRS ADVICE TO TAXPAYERS WHO SUSPECT FRAUD
The IRS would now tell any taxpayer who suspected fraud in any communication,
which allegedly came from the IRS to:
Go to your app and verify the document (or communication).
The advice is simple. The IRS will say the same thing and have the same answer
regardless of the fraud attempted. Repeated announcements will make the solution
second nature to the taxpaying public. Thus:
(1) If an e-mail shows up in a taxpayer’s inbox without a QR code, the taxpayer will
immediately recognize it as fraudulent. The taxpayers may want to forward the email on to the IRS through the app for a whistle-blower award.
(2) If the e-mail has a QR code, the taxpayer can immediately test the validity of the
e-mail with the app.
39

SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is the standard security technology for establishing an encryption link
between a web server and a browser. This link ensures that all data passed between the web server and
browsers remain private. SSL.Com, Q10241 – FAQ: What is SSL? available at:
http://info.ssl.com/article.aspx?id=10241
40
QR (Quick Response) Codes are machine-readable codes consisting of an array of black and white
squares, typically used for storing URLs or other information for reading by the camera on a smart phone.
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(3) If there is an e-mail attachment (like a CP-2000) this form should also have a QR
code. If there is a QR code the taxpayer should immediately test the document, if
not the document is fraudulent, and should be reported.
(4) If a document comes in the regular mail the same process will be repeated. Valid
documents will have QR codes on them that can be verified.
(5) If a phone scam is attempted, a taxpayer can immediately access the app and ask
through the secure channel if the IRS has an outstanding notice for him that may
not have been received. The caller should be asked details about the alleged
notice or letter. These details should allow the taxpayer to confirm the veracity of
the caller’s assertion.
If the IRS adopts the Dubai Solution, countless follow-up scams can be prevented.
If we just consider just IRS notices, there are over a hundred that could be counterfeited,
mailed or attached to an e-mail. There are twelve high frequency notices that can easily
fit the CP-2000 email scam profile.41
Given that it would take approximately six months to install the Dubai Solution in
the IRS, it would seem that the return on investment would be about six to nine months
further out. This is indeed the kind of “service” the public expects from the IRS.

41

The most common notices that could be used for this purpose are:
CP 12 - The IRS made changes to correct a miscalculation on a return.
CP 14 - First notice that a balance is due.
CP 31 - A refund check was returned to the IRS. Need to update address.
CP 42 - The amount of a refund has changed because the IRS used it to pay a spouse's past due tax debt.
CP 49 - All or part of a refund was used to pay a tax debt.
CP 90/CP 297 - Final notice -- notice of intent to levy and notice of the taxpayer's right to a hearing.
CP 91/CP 298 - Final notice before levy on Social Security benefits.
CP 161 - Request for payment or notice of unpaid balance.
CP 501 - First reminder notice that there is a balance due.
CP 503 - Second reminder notice that there is a balance due.
CP 504 - Final balance due notice. If amount is not paid immediately, the IRS will seize (levy) a state
tax refund and search for other assets to levy.
• CP 523 - Notice of default on installment agreement and imminent seizure (levy) of assets.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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